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GEOGRAPHIES OF GENEROSITY 
 
“It is not an accident or a limitation or a prejudice that we cannot care equally about 
all the suffering in the world: it is a condition of our existence and sanity”.  
Bernard Williams (2006, 147) 
 
1). Introduction 
There is now a wide variety of work which argues that Geographers should take more 
sustained notice of ethical theory and moral philosophy (e.g. Casey 1997, Corbridge    
1993, 1994, Sayer and Storper, 1997, Proctor and Smith, 1999, Sack 1998, 2003, 
Smith 2000, Harvey 2000, Cloke 2003, Lee and Smith 2004). David Smith (1997) 
goes so far to suggest that there is ‘moral turn’ underway in the discipline. The papers 
in this Special Issue are a contribution to this set of debates. They build on discussions 
of both ‘caring at a distance’ (Silk, 1998 2000, 2004; Smith, 2000) and ‘geographies 
of responsibility’ (Popke 2003, Massey 2004). These two topics have become central 
themes around which geographers have addressed moral philosophy and theories of 
ethics. And discussion of caring at a distance and the geographies of responsibility 
both frame Geography as an enterprise that is peculiarly well suited to the dilemmas 
of the contemporary, globalised world.  
The claims made on behalf of Geography in these debates are dependent on 
particular assumptions about the way in which normative issues articulate with the 
theoretical and empirical projects of the discipline. In this paper, we challenge some 
of these assumptions, particularly with respect to their treatment of the theme of 
partiality in ethics and justice. Debates in Geography often present partial 
commitments as morally or politically problematic on the grounds that they prioritise 
self-interest, exclusionary, and geographically restricted ways of relating to others. 
Partiality is, then, often seen as an impediment to the expansion of care, concern, or 
justice to ‘others’ over ‘distance’. In Sections 2 and 3 below, we outline how debates 
about caring at a distance and the geographies of responsibility frame partiality as a 
problem to be overcome. We then go, on, in Section 4 to use the theme of generosity 
as an entry point in order to argue that partiality and finitude might be the conditions 
for any ethical-political project that is at once both geographically expansive and 
geographically sensitive.   
 
2). Caring at a Distance 
The starting assumption of discussions about ‘caring at a distance’ is that the sorts of 
virtues that people display towards loved ones, friends, neighbours, or compatriots 
become that much more difficult to sustain over large distances. There is, 
furthermore, a tendency in these discussions to run ‘distance’ together with 
‘difference’ so that the problem of caring at a distance is rendered equivalent to the 
problem of relating to ‘Others’: the central figure of these debates is that of the distant 
stranger. Distance and difference are considered problems precisely because it is 
‘care’ that is the privileged virtue in these discussions. The value of caring 
relationships in contemporary moral philosophy is derived from a thorough going 
critique of universalising theories of justice. The justice/care pair is easily mapped 
onto the universal/particular pair, and in turn onto the impartiality/partiality pair. In 
turn, it is easy for Geographers to suppose that the universal and the particular map 
onto spatial relations of distance and extension on the one hand, place and proximity 
on the other.  
 3 
It is from this set of homologies between, on the one side, justice, universality, 
impartiality, and distance, and on the other hand care, particularity, partiality, and 
proximity that Geographers’ distinctive problematization of caring at a distance is 
derived. Sympathetic to the difference-critique of universalising theories of justice, 
attuned as they are to variety and diversity, Geographers are nonetheless loath to 
wholeheartedly embrace the value of care precisely because of its implied affirmation 
of the unavoidably partial nature of any and all ethical judgement. The value of care is 
necessarily derived from it being a virtue of partiality, extended to some particular 
others on the grounds of attachments of feeling or emotion. Care is therefore easily 
contrasted to the dictates of reason, either positively or negatively. This leads to the 
dilemma whereby embracing the value of care seems to undermine the value of 
equality which underwrites any workable principle of social justice. Justice is not 
supposed to allow for differential consideration on the basis of personal attachment or 
partiality. The idea that the value of care should be elevated over the abstract value of 
justice can, as Smith (2000, 97) notes, easily turn into an excuse for caring only for 
one’s family or friends, or perhaps an exclusively defined set of members of the same 
ethnic or national group as oneself. Yet justice also seems to threaten to impose a 
degree of impersonality in its application of universal principles. The question that 
arises is whether it is possible to maintain the sensitivity to personal, embodied 
expressions of need that underwrites the value of care (as distinct from justice, whose 
value lies in impartiality), while combining it with an extension over geographical 
space and to people different from oneself.    
Michael Slote (2000), one of the key figures in the contemporary revival of virtue 
theories of ethics, suggests that one way of solving this conundrum is to distinguish 
between two kinds of caring relationships: intimate caring, based on personal 
relations with people one knows very well, and humanitarian caring, extended 
towards others one only knows about.  But this distinction still seems to suggest that 
the paradigm for care is naturally given in some way, after which the question of 
extension is added on as a kind of secondary supplement. Indeed, there is a long 
tradition that views care in terms of an apparently natural pattern of obligations, for 
which the paradigm remains at the scale and scope of family relations. The intimate 
caring/humanitarian caring distinction therefore reiterates an older distinction 
between ‘caring for’ and ‘caring about’ (Noddings 1984). This distinction is rooted in 
the assumption that the primary source of the value of caring relations derives from a 
person being focused on and absorbed by other people. Care implies sensitivity to the 
specificity of the needs of other people. According to this definition, the value of care 
seems to mitigate against the extension of care to anonymous others. ‘Caring for’ 
others is, in short, supposed to be more authentic than ‘caring about’ others, in large 
part because caring for is performed directly, up close, face-to-face, in relations of 
very intimate proximity; whereas ‘caring about’ allows distance to intrude into these 
relations thus producing indirect, mediated relations. 
One finds in Geographers’ discussions the same assumption that the value of care is 
uniquely derived from intimate, place-based relationships, and that obligations to 
distant strangers are in some way derivative of these relationships. For some, morality 
sensibility itself is formed in place-based contexts (Sack   1997). Geography in turn is 
held to be  particularly well-attuned to understanding the place-based practices upon 
which any more extended activity of caring must, it is argued, be founded. The 
capacity to care at a distance is held to be possible because place-based relationships 
of care are universal, in the sense that they are found everywhere, without necessarily 
being universalising. The challenge, on this view, is to imagine ways of extending 
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“the geographical, psychological and political scope of a universal human activity” 
(Silk 2004, 229).  
What is of value in Geography’s discussion of care is the affirmation of the 
significance of relationships of partiality in motivating ordinary, everyday practices of 
commitment and concern. But this affirmation is too readily tied to a prioritization of 
place-based relationships which set place off against distanciated and differentiated 
relationships. It is from this uneasy combination that the idea that caring at a distance 
is a problem is derived.  
Rather than supposing that caring-about is a secondary, derivative variant of a more 
genuine set of relationships of caring-for, we might instead start from the observation 
that any caring practice, in order for it to be caring, has to be attentive and responsive 
to the needs of the other. The capacity to care-about comes prior to actual practices of 
caring, and remains an essential aspect of them. In making this suggestion, we are 
following Fisher and Tronto’s (1990) argument that in practice care is composed of 
four activities each of which is associated with a distinctive moral capacity:  
 
1. the capacity to be attentive to the needs of others;  
2. the capacity of taking responsibility for meeting needs for care;  
3. the capacity to actually provide care competently;  
4. the capacity to be responsive to the ongoing needs of receivers of care.  
 
Practices of care involve the complex integration of all four of these activities, and 
this in turn involves the co-ordination of activities over various spaces and diverse 
temporalities, or what McKie et al (2002) refer to as caring-scapes. The idea that 
care’s value lies only in the intense familiarity of circumscribed personal relationships 
is not sustainable once we recognize the degree to which any caring practice depends 
on mediating practices, relations of professional competency, and various institutional 
and material infrastructures. 
Above all,  what Fisher and Tronto’s distinction between four aspects of caring 
suggests is that care is something that is called forward by the expression of needs by 
others, and that in turn requires an ongoing disposition of attentiveness and 
responsiveness towards others. The irreducibility of these dispositions suggests that a 
crucial aspect of having the competency to care is a certain degree of distance, 
passivity and separation. These are the conditions for hearing and acknowledging the 
expressions of need coming from others.  
The practical dependence of care on attentive relations of responsiveness is one 
reason why we should reject the imaginary geography that associates the genuine 
value of care with place-based relations, and therefore sees distance as a barrier to 
care. It is from this understanding that the idea that geographically expansive moral or 
political relationships need to be justified arises (e.g. Brock 2005). In fact, there is a 
strong normative case against this association of the value of care with place-based 
relations of intimacy and attachment. Onora O’Neill (1996, 149-50) points out that 
there is a strong tendency to see certain virtues (like care, trust, or kindness) as 
properly embedded in specific types of relationships – characteristically, those with 
friends and family. She points out that these relationships are also the sites of various 
vices, for example, neglect, unkindness, deceit and betrayal. The conclusion she 
derives from this observation is pertinent to Geography’s treatment of the geographies 
of care:  
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If the very relationships that provide preferred contexts for various virtues also 
provide fertile grounds for the contrasting vices, these contexts cannot be 
constitutive of those virtues.  
 
This argument applies as much to the spatial contexts that geographers often present 
as the exemplary scenes of various moral virtues as it does to the relational contexts 
O’Neill has in mind. In short, there is no good reason to suppose that moral harm 
arises only through relations of distancing, exclusion, or non-recognition; nor that 
relations of proximity are the natural scene of moral virtue (Barnett 2005).  
 
3). Geographies of Responsibility 
Fisher and Tronto’s four-fold model of care outlined above suggests that the 
motivation of virtuous actions such as caring cannot be solely self-referential or 
monological. If care is embedded in relations of attentiveness and responsiveness, 
then determining the scope of obligations or responsibilities is not simply a matter of 
reasoning and calculation about the consequences of one’s own self-caused actions or 
those of the collectivity to which one belongs. In turn, this means that the practical 
motivation of action is unlikely to be dependent only on the didactic practices of 
demonstration and proof. We make this point because of the widespread assumption 
that geography has a special educational role to play in transforming the moral 
imaginations of pupils, students, and the general public by showing how their actions 
are entangled in spatially and temporally extended networks of unintended 
consequences.  
The forms of partiality that both feminist theorists of care and communitarian 
theorists value are too often conceptually embedded in the personal sentiments that 
motivate care for one’s nearest and dearest (see Smith 2000, 97-106). As we have 
seen above, Geographers have been concerned with finding justifications for 
extending the scope of care in a humanitarian fashion, to more anonymous others in 
distant locations. In making these arguments, there is a tendency to fall back on a 
variant of weak universalism, which posits some principle of identity, solidarity, or 
similarity as the grounds for extending care to distant strangers. This is where 
arguments about caring at a distance connect up discussions of the ‘geographies of 
responsibility’. Geographers have argued that the imperative to extend obligations 
over distance follows from the complexity of causal relationships that connect people 
living in different places through market transactions, supply chains, or displaced 
pollution effects. These connections mean that we are in fact bound up with and 
implicated in the lives of all sorts of people living in all sorts of different places 
(Corbridge 1998). The attractiveness of this model of responsibility lies in the idea 
that geography is very well placed to provide the pedagogical resources that will 
demonstrate to those in positions of privilege that they do, indeed, have these sorts of 
responsibilities. Empirical observation of the interdependence of spatially disparate 
activities is presented as the key foundation for an expanded geographical ethics of 
responsibility appropriate for a globalised world. Geography’s value as a discipline 
lies in the claim that knowledge of distant outcomes is a prerequisite for responsible 
action.  
There are various examples of this paradigm of geographical responsibility. One 
reference point is Harvey’s (1990) account of the geographical imagination, which 
has helped to generate a whole field of work on commodity chains in which it is 
supposed that, by demonstrating the linkages between locations of production, 
networks of distribution, and acts of consumption, the alienating effects of modern 
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capitalism can be exposed. Actor-network theory has been enrolled into the same type 
of project (Whatmore and Thorne 1997). The shared assumption of these type of 
accounts is that the secret to motivating practical action lies in helping people to re-
cognise their entanglement in complex networks of commodification and 
accumulation (Castree 2001). In the process, the defunct theory of commodity 
fetishism is not only redeemed as a moral tale for our times, but fetishism is in turn 
reframed as essentially having to do with a deficit of empirical knowledge. 
Knowledge, in turn, is made into the prerequisite for various strategies of re-
connection.  
These sorts of arguments only work if we presume two things. Firstly, we must 
presume that ordinary people are not already, currently engaged in all sorts of caring, 
responsible activity, but that they are trapped within self-interested, privatised worlds 
of restricted imagination. Secondly, in turn, we must presume that this restricted 
imagination is caused by their inhabiting a world of veiled relations that hides from 
view their real interests and obligations. There is an unacknowledged moralism at 
work in these discussions. The presumption is that people are naturally inclined to act 
in egoistical pursuit of their own self-interest unless motivated by knowledge and 
reason to do otherwise. Perhaps the problem here comes from the fixation on the 
vocabulary of responsibility itself. Talking about responsibility immediately brings to 
mind the idea that it has to do with imputing blame and establishing liability (Ricouer 
2000). ‘Responsibility’ and ‘obligation’ sound like burdens, the sorts of things people 
might reasonably be expected to try to shirk if they could.  
Tracking the geographies of intended or unintended consequences of actions does 
little to establish the locus or scope of moral or political responsibility. The normative 
claim of the geographies of responsibility literature lies in the argument that we are all 
implicated in geographically extensive ‘communities of affected interest’ that spill 
over the boundaries of territorialized polities and the obligations of citizenship 
(Massey 2004). There are different variants of this model in Geography, but each one 
depends on establishing some type of causal loop between actions and consequences. 
The connection might be simply an assertion of causal responsibility, as in debates 
about sustainable consumption for example, where it is often argued that people, as 
consumers, help to reproduce destructive environmental practices by the purchases. In 
other accounts the demonstration of a connection might be supplemented by a claim 
that some people benefit from being positioned in such spatially extensive networks, 
and that therefore one has a responsibility that follows from unfair reward (Corbridge, 
1998). Furthermore, the demonstration of the connection is routinely accompanied by 
an appeal to self-interest, as in the case of many environmental campaigns. Such 
campaigns often position people as responsible on the grounds that they are 
implicated in environmentally destructive systems of production and consumption 
that in the future will threaten their own, or their children’s, health, livelihood, or 
security.  
These understandings of responsibility, based on identifying connections between 
our actions and distant, mediated consequences, seem straightforwardly 
‘geographical’. They seem to assume that the task of motivating practical action 
inheres in the activity of tracking the routes and networks through which our own 
actions link up to actions and events elsewhere, or later on. There are two problems 
with this assumption. Firstly, what falls from view in these geographies of 
responsibility is any concern with the relationships of attentiveness and 
responsiveness that we discussed in section 2 above: the geographies of responsibility 
literature remains resolutely monological in its favoured emphasis on the need to 
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justify responsibility by reference to an actor’s own actions. Secondly, even in its own 
terms, it turns out that the assumption that simply describing causal, systematic 
linkages between (unwitting) actions and (unintended) consequences justifies 
practical actions does not stand up anyway. Why is the case?  
Establishing that actions have outcomes that may not have been intended, because 
of the intermediary operations of other human and non-human actors that are required 
for these actions to come-off successfully, is certainly a good way of showing people 
that their own actions do, indeed, have potentially wide consequences. But precisely 
because the demonstration of a person’s implication in, for example, labour 
exploitation in far away places or in environmental degradation only works by 
establishing the dependence of these consequences on myriad mediating actions, then 
strictly speaking the motivating force of the demonstration is fairly indeterminate. It 
might persuade a person that their actions contribute, in small ways, to the 
reproduction of those harms. It is just as likely for someone to conclude that their 
contribution is so highly mediated that not only are they not able to do much about it, 
but that this doesn’t really count as being responsible in any reasonable sense at all. 
This is the impasse that any theory that derives responsibility or obligation from the 
consequences of an actor’s own actions ends up facing:  
 
A person can be morally responsible only for what he does; but what he does 
results from a great deal that he does not do; therefore he is not morally 
responsible for what he is and is not responsible for (Nagel 1979, 34).  
 
Nagel’s point here is that grounding questions of responsibility on causal principles 
alone actually leaves everything important about the motivation of practical action out 
of the picture. Because the ‘geographies of responsibility’ literature presumes that 
people are responsible by virtue of the extended consequences of their own actions it 
cannot in fact do what it claims to do, namely establish a compelling reason for 
anyone to take responsibility for distant suffering or distress.   
By presuming that either empirical or conceptual demonstrations of causal 
implication in distanciated  relationships of connection and entanglement can both 
justify and thereby motivate practical action, Geographers too often fail to give 
adequate attention to what one might call, after Korsgaard (1996), the sources of 
normativity. By this, we refer to the closely linked questions of why normative claims 
should be acted upon at all and of how conduct in relation to norms, principles, and 
values is actually motivated in practice. To illustrate why it might be worth taking 
more time to consider these questions, consider the similar looking arguments of Iris 
Marion Young (2004) and Onora O’Neill (2000) on global justice. Both authors 
propose a geographically expansive account of moral and political obligations. In 
terms of their geographical content, both arguments seem to support Geographers’ 
assertions about the stretching of responsibility over globalised networks of action. 
However under closer scrutiny they mobilise the geographical aspect of their 
argument in relation to somewhat different normative principles – the reasons for 
acting they provide and presume are significantly different.  
Young’s account of global labour solidarity does more than tell a geographical story 
about the responsibilities we have by way of our being connected into wider spatial 
systems. Her aim is, rather, to establish some basic principles through which people 
can reason about their actions (Young 2004, 385). Her account stresses questions of 
power and privilege as well as simply connection, and it is certainly compelling. Our 
point here is that Young’s guiding normative principle is the idea that people are 
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likely to be moved by a concern to avoid reproducing their unwitting implication in 
the reproduction of harm to others.  
In O’Neill’s work, one can find a similar looking argument, and one that comes to 
similar looking conclusions regarding the widened geographical scope of 
responsibility and obligation. But it is premised on a different normative principle. 
O’Neill suggests that we should afford equal moral status to distant others because, in 
our everyday activities, we presume and take for granted their status as moral agents.  
Therefore we owe justice and moral standing to distant strangers as well as to those 
close at hand:  
 
Hence if we owe justice (or other forms of moral concern) to all whose 
capacities to act, experience and suffer we take for granted in acting, we will 
owe it to strangers as well as to familiars, and to distant strangers as well as to 
those who are near at hand (2000: 196). 
 
The important point here is that O’Neill’s guiding principle of moral motivation is not 
the avoidance of harm, as in Young. It is instead a revised, constructivist account of 
Kantian universalizability, according to which actors are beholden by their practical 
actions to treat others as pure ends in themselves.  
The point of contrasting O’Neill and Young is twofold. First, and to reiterate, 
neither thinks that simply establishing geographically extensive patterns of causal 
responsibility has any motivating force in and of itself. This is precisely why, in both 
cases, appeals are also made to aspects of self-interest and to a sense of fairness as 
well as to geographical connections. Second, focussing only on the geographical 
content of these accounts, on the assumption that it is geographical knowledge that 
can and must fulfil the motivating function, has the effect of hiding from view the 
different normative principles that are in play in these demonstrations: principles such 
as the avoidance of harm, expressions of solidarity, or autonomy. What both Young 
and O’Neill demonstrate is that, on its own, the mere fact of being bound into 
relationships with distant others does not actually provide any compelling reason that 
could account for or motivate relationships of care, concern, or obligation. Nor, in 
either case, is it actually meant to.   
Even in cases where strong arguments can be mustered that there are causal 
relationships between our actions and distant people and places, questions of practical 
motivation only get off the ground once issues of direct liability or blame are left 
behind. Therefore it is important to attend more closely to the sorts of claims made 
about why being geographically implicated should lead to any type of practical action. 
In their engagements with moral philosophy and political theory, perhaps 
Geographers should take a little more time to reflect on the assumptions that different 
theoretical accounts make about what sorts of motivations and influences people are, 
and should be, susceptible to. These assumptions can, of course, be assessed 
empirically, but they are also subject to normative assessment in their own right.    
What both Young and O’Neill demonstrate is that, at the very least, the reasons one 
might have for acting differently or not in light of causal knowledge are not likely to 
be reasons of knowledge alone. This point returns us to the theme of attending to and 
responding to others. There is a deep strain of thinking that imagines that 
understandings of responsibility and obligation could be arrived at monologically, 
outside of any encounter with others. This is a disposition which, in presuming that it 
is possible or preferable to take on the suffering of the world, inadvertently arrogates 
to itself the perspective of impartial observer (Williams 2006, 145). There is a degree 
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of detachment implied by thinking that tracking consequences and worrying primarily 
about the outcomes (whether intended or unintended) of one’s actions could or should 
provide the criteria for normatively evaluating one’s conduct. In the case of both care 
and responsibility, a crucial aspect in the motivation of actions is likely to be 
attending to and responding to the expressions and claims of others. The fixation on 
chains of causality hides from view the degree to which responsible, caring action is 
motivated not in monological reflection on one’s own obligations, but by encounters 
with others. 
 
4). Generosity, Motivation and Disposition   
Geographers have tended to assume a particular model of moral agency in their 
discussions of care and responsibility. It is a model that is widespread, perhaps even 
foundational, of a whole field of social science endeavour (Barnes 2000). It presumes 
that agency is a vector of blame, shame, and guilt, and that causal explanation is a 
prerequisite for motivating responsible, other-regarding action (Williams 1995). This, 
in turn, informs a pedagogy which presumes that people need to be shown the 
consequences of their actions in order to be motivated to change, to take 
responsibility, to become more caring for the world around them. Not only does this 
pedagogy assume that such motivation works by tracking the consequences of action, 
(more or less intended, more or less spatially dispersed). More worryingly, it assumes 
that people don’t already care, aren’t already acting responsibly. The exhortatory 
register of so much of Geography’s discussion of morality and politics certainly fits 
with the temper of the times, in which there is a widespread assumption that people 
are naturally inclined to be self-interested egoists. Some people (phantom neoliberals, 
mostly) think this is a good thing, and that more people should behave like this; many 
more, across the political spectrum, think that that more and more people do act like 
this, but that this is a bad thing. In this section, we want to elaborate on the theme of 
generosity, in order to suggest that this base-line assumption of egoism and self-
interest might not be the best starting-point from which to approach questions of 
practical, normative action. And we want to suggest that, despite whatever ‘moral’ 
overtones it might possess, generosity be thought of primarily as a political concept: 
generosity is a modality of power akin to forgiving or promising, that is, as a practice 
through which “the living together of people” is routinely sustained over time and 
space (Arendt 1958, 180).     
Sack (2003, 31) argues that a moral theory “cannot force us to behave well. It can 
only persuade us through logic and reason that it discloses a better way of acting”. 
While the first part of this observation might be correct, the second part raises the 
question of whether the force of persuasion to which people are susceptible is limited 
to logic and reason alone. In pedagogic practice, Geography’s engagement with moral 
philosophy has certainly not restricted itself to logic and reason at all. We have 
already suggested that there is an implicit model of moral motivation at work in 
Geography, one that turns on the idea that people can be moved to ethical action by a 
combination of empirically demonstrating their implication in distant consequences 
with an emotionally charged imputation of guilt. Geographers have also focussed 
primarily on providing justifications for caring more or taking more responsibility, 
where this often refers to extending care and responsibility over distance. Now, any 
attempt at the justification of practical conduct necessarily implies some model of 
how ethical motivation works (Nagel 1970, 3). As already noted, the theories of ethics 
and morality that Geographers have developed are not merely addressed at other 
academics; they are embedded in pedagogic programmes that circulate in public 
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spaces of education, news journalism, and even popular media. As Nagel observes, 
the notion that the motivational problems of practical action require one to find a 
robust principle by which people will be justifiably persuaded to act presumes that 
this consideration, whatever it might be, can be successfully conceived by theorists 
and then communicated through one form or other of pedagogic practice. We suggest 
that people are motivated in all sorts of ways, by all sorts of different things.Any 
putative justification for acting morally “must rest on empirical assumptions about the 
influences to which people are susceptible” (ibid., 3). If these assumptions are not true 
of those to whom a moral argument is addressed – of those about whom it is mean to 
apply, if not directly persuade – then the justification will have “neither validity or 
persuasive force” (ibid., 4).  
So, one question that arises for us is just what types of ‘motivational influence’ do 
Geographers assume people are susceptible to? We have already suggested that one 
answer to this is that there is an excessive investment in the influence of causal 
knowledge. But another question that arises, in so far as this first answer seems 
plausible, is just what is the motivational problem to which Geographers accounts of 
caring at a distance and the geographies of responsibility are meant to provide a 
solution? It seems to us that across the range of debates reviewed in sections 2 and 3, 
there is a broadly shared assumption that the task of a morally engaged, normatively 
committed Geography is to overcome entrenched tendencies towards acting in self-
interested ways and according to a geographically restricted horizon of obligation. 
Self-interest and egoism are routinely aligned with having a restricted geographical 
imagination, and are counterposed to moral ‘goods’ such as altruism, which is in turn 
aligned with more expansive geographical horizons. For example, Sack argues that 
“altruism inspires a care for distant strangers (others with whom one has no personal 
connection and hence nothing personally to claim)” (Sack 2003, 29). He further 
claims that the task of Geography is to assist in justifying why people should be “less 
self-centred and more altruistic” (ibid., 38). Why is it that Geographers fall so easily 
into assuming that people are naturally self-interested egoists? Why is it that caring, 
being responsible, acting out of concern for strangers, are not recognised to be an 
ordinary part of everyday life? And why is it that acting out of altruistic motivations 
should be considered wholly at odds with self-regarding concerns?   
These are, of course, rhetorical questions. In order to shift attention away from the 
assumption that self-interest is a natural disposition that needs to be countered, and 
that moral actions such as altruism need to be motivated by providing cast-iron 
justifications, we are drawn towards the theme of generosity. We focus here on the 
question of the relationship between self-interest and altruism, because it provides a 
way into this theme of generosity. It is true that most models of altruism remain 
resolutely monological. They tend to keep the focus of moral agency squarely on the 
giver, who is ascribed all the active attributes of moral subjectivity, at the cost of the 
receiver, who is thereby rendered a rather passive subject. Furthermore, by 
discounting the validity of instrumental concerns in motivating altruistic actions, such 
models suppose that the value of an altruistic act can be wholly determined by 
reference to the intention behind it, irrespective of the outcomes of any such act. Both 
these problems arise from the assumption that altruism and egoism are related in zero-
sum terms: that being altruistic requires one to gainsay various self-regarding 
motivations. But one cannot account for other-regarding conduct without considering 
the co-implication of self-interest and altruism, of intrinsic and instrumental concerns 
(see Mansbridge 1990). For one thing, the ‘goods’ valued by the recipient or 
beneficiary of any altruistic act must be taken into consideration by the generous 
 11 
subject – the generous act is, after all, meant to augment their capacities and 
capabilities:  
 
we cannot coherently imagine a world in which everyone had exclusively 
altruistic motivations. The goal of the altruist is to provide others with an 
occasion for selfish pleasures – the pleasure of reading a book or drinking 
a bottle of wine one has received as a gift. If nobody had first-order, 
selfish pleasures, nobody could have higher-order, altruistic motives either 
(Elster 1989, 53-4).  
 
It turns out that altruism only makes sense if one supposes that other people, the 
objects of one’s generosity, have a quite valid interest in their own pleasures, in 
augmenting their own capacities. If this instrumental, outcome-oriented consideration 
is discounted, any altruistic act – the giving of care, or knowledge, or objects without 
concern for oneself - would turn out to be self-negating. It would be little more than 
an act done to augment the moral righteousness of the generous subject.  
So rather than supposing that altruism and egoism are opposed versions of selfhood, 
we might think instead of the co-existence of two different perspectives that go 
together to make up ethical subjectivity: a subjective, partial, personal perspective, in 
which a person acts as an ‘I’; and an impersonal perspective, in which actors strive to 
adopt an objective position on states of affairs (see Nagel 1986). We have learnt to be 
rightly suspicious of accounts that privilege an abstracted, detached perspective, and 
to recognise the validity of the affections, concerns and goals that people experience 
from their own partial, personal perspective. But we should not suppose that these two 
perspectives are opposed to one another, nor that the subjective, personal dimension 
of ethical dispositions is resolutely hostile to reason. The possibility of self-less 
virtues like prudence and altruism is testament to the capacity to view oneself as 
persisting through time (prudence) and of recognising the reality of other persons 
(altruism). While altruism depends on the “full recognition of other persons”, this also 
depends on having a conception of oneself as “merely one person among others”, 
(Nagel 1970, 88). It is this impersonal perspective that is crucial to any responsive 
form of practical conduct, since it is the condition for acting in relation to the insistent 
demand of practical reason, that is, of acting in the expectation of having to give an 
understandable account or offer a normative justification for one’s conduct before 
others. Assuming that moral action follows solely from the personal perspective of the 
‘I’ would be to “to view oneself as a benevolent bureaucrat distributing such benefits 
as one can control to countless other beings, with whom one may have various 
relations or none” (Nagel 1979, 88). Practical action that is responsive and attentive, 
in contrast, therefore requires the capacity “to view oneself simultaneously as ‘I’ and 
as someone – an impersonally specifiable individual” (Nagel 1970, 19). This latter, 
‘objective’ perspective is the condition of being able to cultivate “a view of oneself as 
a small being interacting with others in a large world” (Nagel 1979, 88). It is a view 
that presupposes and requires that one might be called upon to offer interpersonal 
justifications for one’s actions and points of view. On this view, principles become 
important not in grounding action in advance, but in contexts where the necessarily 
finite qualities of any action provoke occasions to give reasons and provide 
justifications.   
Nagel’s classic account of the possibility of altruism indicates that arguments about 
morality, ethics, and the like do not need to abandon the realm of reasonable argument 
in favour of moral exhortation. They do, though, need to consider more modest, less 
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subject-centred conceptions of the self. One source for developing such conceptions is 
recent literature on the theme of generosity. Thinking about relationships of 
generosity suggests a different placement of self-interest and other-regarding virtues, 
of egoism and altruism, and also points towards a more practical agenda for thinking 
through the normative issues raised in Geography’s ‘moral turn’. Issues of giving, the 
gift, and generosity have become increasingly important in mainstream moral 
philosophy and social theory, as well as in debates inflected by post-foundationalist 
Continental philosophy (Schrift, 1997)). This range of work suggests a rethinking of 
normative questions that might escape the strictures and prescriptions of those 
accounts that focus overwhelmingly on providing justifications for various forms of 
obligation or responsibility.   
Theories of the gift are often presented as an alternative to the economistic 
calculation of exchange and contract. This understanding is derived from 
anthropology, where the gift has been conceptually constructed as a mode of 
interaction that epitomises values of reciprocity that supposedly ground the very 
possibility of sociality and community. Since Mauss (2002), the gift relation is 
understood to initiate a chain of relations in which the presentation of a gift obligates 
the recipient to offer a gift in return, thereby “setting in motion temporal, lasting 
cycles of obligations” (Gudeman 2001, 80). In anthropology the value of gift relations 
is derived from the assumption that relationships of commodity exchange or contract 
are essentially egoistic and atomistic, whereas the gift is relational and altruistic. In 
this way, anthropological accounts of the gift are frequently seized upon to counter 
the seemingly hegemonic arguments of modern theories of rational choice. 
Theories of the gift are able to offer an alternative to egoistic, self-interested models 
of social interaction only by embedding sociality ever more firmly within a circle of 
obligatory relationships. Derrida’s Given Time (1992) calls into question the 
assumption that gift relations offer a preferred, morally superior model of conduct. He 
shows the degree to which the calculative give and take of gift relations is identical to 
that normally reserved for exchange and contract. Derrida’s demonstration is simple 
enough: starting from the position inherited from Mauss and others, where gift-giving 
is conventionally counter-posed to exchange, he shows that as soon as a gift is given 
knowingly as a gift, the subject of generosity is always anticipating a return, already 
taking credit of some sort, if only credit for being generous. This relationship between 
giving and taking inscribes the gift within a circuit of reciprocal exchange that it is 
supposed to exclude. The apparently ‘ethical’ content of the generous act is thereby 
annulled in the very moment of its taking place.  
The deconstruction of the classical anthropological discourse of a foundational 
reciprocal generosity is shaped by a concern to uncover the degree to which the type 
of moral reasoning exemplified by gift theory is dependent on notions of property – of 
the possession by a sovereign subject of its own self and of other objects. This is the 
‘political unconscious’ of gift theory. Deconstruction de-centres the subject of moral 
obligation through a gesture of dispossession, showing that generosity is not quite so 
straightforwardly in the gift of a subject as might be supposed. Now, the point of this 
demonstration is not to suggest that all social relations are, at base, self-interested 
ones. It is, rather, to call into question the assumption that just relationships must 
necessarily be premised on a principle of symmetrical reciprocity – an assumption 
that underlies monological forms of moral reasoning in which subjects are held to be 
obliged with reference to their own voluntary actions. Derrida’s point is simply that a 
pure gift relation is not possible in practice, nor preferable in principle. It might 
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therefore be a good idea to stop supposing that it should serve as the benchmark of 
critical judgment or normative evaluation.  
It is worth underlining that Derrida’s deconstruction of the gift takes as its object of 
critical analysis not a scene of non-recognition, of non-reciprocity, or of exclusion. Its 
target is an exemplary scene of reciprocal, inter-subjective recognition that might be 
supposed to typify a non-allergic, ethical relationship between self and other. This 
intense suspicion of the morality of reciprocity echoes the phenomenological ethics of 
Emmanuel Levinas (see Barnett 2005). Drawing on Derrida, Levinas, and Irigary, Iris 
Marion Young (1997) has developed the notion that it is in relations of asymmetrical 
reciprocity that ethical relationships find their feet. For Young, far from premising 
ethical action in the logic of reciprocal obligation, it is in relationships that escape the 
logic of contracts and exchange altogether that one might glimpse a mode of relating 
that escapes the circularity and self-possession of obligation. This argument suggests 
an alternative way of framing questions of commitment, one which does not suppose 
that obligation has to be derived from establishing some relationship of debt between 
an active moral subject and their passive object of concern. Rather, it suggests that 
ethical conduct is best exemplified by practices of sacrifice, devotion, and love; 
practices which might be the stuff of ordinary, everyday life (Miller 1998).   
One can find similar sorts of arguments in other lines of thought. The idea that a 
purely self-less act is possible or preferable is, for example, questioned by Jon Elster 
in his account of the relationship of altruism and self-interest:  
 
 Pure nonselfish behaviour is represented by anonymous contributions to 
impersonal charities […] Only gifts from unknown to unknown are 
unambiguously unselfish. (Elster 1989, 55). 
 
This argument has some interesting affinities with Derrida’s argument that only an act 
that disavowed any return, one that could not be knowingly given as a gift, could 
accord with the requirements of a pure gift: a pure gift could not be recognised as a 
gift by another party. Elster’s point, though, throws the deconstruction of the gift into 
new light. He notes that gift giving, as exemplary of altruistic conduct, can all too 
easily serve the interests of the donor (ibid., 58). Generosity can, it seems, also be a 
means of reproducing inequality and dependence.   
This is also the starting point of Rosalind Diprose’s (2002) account of corporeal 
generosity. She notes that many accounts of generosity take for granted the division 
between a set of subjects in possession of things to be given, and a set of subjects to 
whom gifts are passed. Generosity can certainly be undertaken out of a self-interested 
motivation to be seen to be a good person, and as such, might even lead to a 
reproduction of unequal relations of possession. Diprose draws attention to the extent 
to which the idea of generosity as an individual, altruistic virtue that motivates people 
to act towards others with no regard for their own benefit continues to presume that 
generosity is a virtue that inheres wholly in the exercise of sovereignty over the self’s 
own actions.     
The significance of this kind of argument is that it points towards an alternative 
understanding of relations of generosity. What follows from Young’s account of the 
ethics of asymmetrical reciprocity is that generosity is rightfully embedded in 
relationships of responsiveness and attentiveness to others. Likewise, Diprose 
premises generosity on an embodied disposition of openness, a mode of relating that 
constitutes the self as affecting and affected by others. When generosity is separated 
from receptivity to the needs of others (that is, when it is presumed that generosity is 
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an obligation arrived at outside of any encounter with the agency of the receiving 
subject), then it threatens to reproduce harm:  
 
Insofar as generosity does not understand itself to be deeply rooted in a 
receptive encounter with others, it will proliferate a blindness, theft, and 
imperialism despite its best efforts (Coles 1997, 3). 
 
Coles’s notion of receptive generosity is meant to restore this sense of encounter and 
relation to thinking about ethics. It is notable that this type of relationship depends on 
a degree of passivity and separation that redistributes the imagined moral geography 
of relations of proximity and distance. For Coles, Diprose, and Young then, 
generosity is recast as an embodied disposition that subsists in the practices and 
dispositions of attending and responding to others.   
Writers like Young, Coles, and Diprose point towards a normative account of 
generosity not as a regulative ideal, but as a constitutive practice of sociality, 
community, and being together. It is in this sense we suggest that generosity be 
thought of as a modality of power. By this, we mean it is a practice through which 
people ordinarily act in concert to sustain relationships over time and space, 
relationships that enact their own normative principles and which depend upon non-
sovereign modes of selfhood (Arendt 1958, 213-214). We also mean to suggest that 
generosity is not a ‘moral’ concept at all, in so far as this is meant to imply a 
regulative ideal of some sort against which the actualities of practice can be judged 
and evaluated from the position of an impartial observer. Generosity is, by definition, 
a partial virtue that cannot be universalised, precisely because of its emplacement 
within concrete encounters with others, however mediated these may be. This means 
that any given act of generosity must also exclude generosity to others. Like other 
partial virtues such as compassion, the ‘withholding’ of generosity is structurally 
embedded in the act of being generous (cf Berlant 2004). The possibility of 
generosity, so to speak, rests on the impossibility of pure generosity. Or, to put it 
another way, generosity is necessarily a finite, partial virtue, because it is a mundane, 
ordinary, and everyday practice always undertaken in the company of others. 
We have argued here that Geography’s engagements with moral philosophy are 
wrong-headed in so far as they are premised on faulty assumptions about the sorts of 
influences people are liable to act upon (one’s that privilege causal knowledge as the 
primary motivating force), and also flawed assumptions about the sorts of problems 
that academic reasoning about normative issues is meant to address (the assumption 
that people are too egoistical and not altruistic enough). In contrast, we have 
suggested that other-regarding actions are ordinary and everyday; and that the 
consequential actions that motivate people to change their conduct are not only their 
own self-caused actions, but also the actions of other actors who make normative 
demands of them to notice, attend, and respond to their needs (see Barnett et al 2006). 
Our reason for developing this argument here is not to present ‘generosity’ as a 
paradigm of personal, moral conduct or ethics that can or should augment ‘politics’ in 
some way. The normative problems of motivation that are addressed in moral 
philosophy are hardly restricted to ethics or morality alone: they are pressing issues in 
the conceptualisation of political action and the meaning of justice. We do think, 
though, that in relation to debates about politics and morality, justice and ethics, 
Geographers too readily have recourse to modes of monological reasoning which 
suppose that the key to motivating action lies in justification and explanatory 
knowledge. Focussing on a modalities of action such as generosity suggests, instead, a 
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different programme, less exhortatory, more exploratory: one which looks at how 
opportunities to address normative demands in multiple registers are organised and 
transformed; at the ways in which dispositions to respond and to be receptive to others 
are worked up; and how opportunities for acting responsively on these dispositions 
are organised. 
 
5). Geographies of Generosity 
The papers in this issue all build upon debates about caring at a distance and 
geographies of responsibility that we discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Each one also 
develops the analysis of practices of generosity that suggest the limitations of both 
these paradigms. They focus on different aspects of generosity, often with specific 
reference to the ways in which new modes of spatial relationship are constituted 
through institutionally mediated practices of generosity. Empirically, each one 
focuses on the geographies through which generosity is modulated, where this 
includes donating money, volunteering, or giving one’s time in the care of others. 
Theoretically, the papers draw on a range of perspectives concerning the relationships 
between giving and receiving, caring and being cared for. In particular, the papers 
take up the challenge of thinking beyond dualisms of active giving and passive 
receiving, by thinking through both the forms of responsiveness and receptivity that 
motivate generous behaviour as well as the modes of agency that elicit such 
responses. All of the papers therefore use the geographies of generous practices – 
whether this refers to the sites of giving, the spatialities of generosity, or the human 
and natural objects of generous conduct - to examine the multiple and complex 
motivations of generous practices, and the way in which these intersect with wider 
projects of political and social transformation.  
Martin Buttle turns his attention to practices of generosity that are enabled, framed 
by and promoted through different organisational infrastructures, starting from the 
premise that people are generous in myriad different ways. Buttle’s paper focuses on 
people’s engagement with ethical banks. People have made considered decisions to 
transfer their banking requirements to banks that operate explicitly ethical modes of 
practice that include contributing to various charitable development programmes. 
Buttle asks how such banks construct ethical discourses, and in what ways they enrol 
customers into particular models of what it is to be concerned with the fate of others..  
We have already seen that ‘distance’ is a privileged topic in geography’s discussion 
of moral philosophy. The idea that distance is an impediment to generous responses to 
the needs of others or to caring action is challenged in the next two papers. Paul 
Cloke, Jon May and Sarah Johnston focus on the forms of othering through which 
homelessness is constructed as an occasion for people to engage in so-called ‘moral 
selving’. The structural process and the powers of agency that have seen a tangible 
rise in homelessness are hidden, yet what is obvious is the increased number of 
homeless people. The mediating practices that allow people to be generous with their 
time and energy as volunteers is premised on homeless people not being distant, but 
up close and visible. Sean Carter looks at how a stretched-out, distanciated network of 
generosity and care was developed and sustained amongst a diasporic community of 
Croatian migrants in North America during the 1990s. In this case, distance from an 
imaginary ‘homeland’ is the very condition for the development of networks of 
assistance which combined an ambivalent mix of material, political, and moral 
support. There is, in short, a geopolitics of generosity.   
The final two papers in this issue explicitly challenge the terms on which 
Geography’s ‘moral turn’ has been conceptualised and institutionalised. Ian Cook et 
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al develop a sustained critique of the pedagogies through which Geography in schools 
as well as in tertiary education has put in place a mode of moral education premised 
on making cognitive connections between ‘here’ and ‘there’. They outline an 
alternative practice of affective pedagogy that exceeds and challenges the established 
model of ‘cognitive mapping’. Nigel Clark’s paper questions the extent to which non-
human agency can call forward generous responses. He argues that the global 
response to the Asian tsunami in December 2004 was provoked by its qualities as an 
event, not simply as a response to the needs of affected people. Both these papers, 
then, return to the argument outlined above, that thinking about the geography of 
generosity opens up new horizons for understanding the receptive, responsive, and 
attentive relationships through which ethical action is provoked.  
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